The Impact of Policy on Federal Standing by Pitman, Henry
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 45 Issue 3 Article 3 
1976 
The Impact of Policy on Federal Standing 
Henry Pitman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry Pitman, The Impact of Policy on Federal Standing, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 515 (1976). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
COIVImENTS
THE IMPACT OF POLICY ON FEDERAL STANDING
Few areas of federal law have produced as much confusion for attorneys
and judges as the doctrine of standing.1 Between 1968 and 1973, the Supreme
Court decided a number of cases2 which significantly liberalized the require-
ments of the doctrine. 3 Although the more recent cases4 appear to have
retreated5 from this position, whether the Court has in fact modified its liberal
stance on this issue is not yet certain.
The issue of standing involves both constitutional and court-imposed
limitations 6 on the power of the judiciary. Since the discretionary aspects of
the doctrine concern serious questions of federal judicial policy, a finding of
standing in one case may have little value as precedent in a subsequent case in
which the policy considerations are significantly different. Unfortunately, the
frequent failure of the Court to acknowledge the impact of these differences in
policy has generated confusion regarding the appropriate standards in this
area. 7 As a result, in recent rulings the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
1. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150. 151 (1970),
United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953); Seanwell
Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 255, 256 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Private
Actions].
2. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Trafficante v.. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co..
409 U.S. 205 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In spite of the fact that the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton found that
the petitioners lacked standing, the decision can still be regarded as part of the line of cases
reducing standing requirements since it recognized the existence of non-economic, aesthetic injury
as a basis for standing. 405 U.S. at 734.
3. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
4. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976); Warth v. Selchn, 422
U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). See
Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 537
F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976) (rehearing en banc) (The slip opinion of the Second Circuit's en banc
rehearing captions the case Evans v. Hills due to Carla A. Hills' succeeding James T Lynn as
Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.) Evans v. Hills. No 74-1793
(2d Cir., June 4, 1976), 537 F.2d 589 n.1. But see City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 879 (D.
Conn. 1975), modified 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
5. Comment, Federal Standing: 1976, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 383 (1976).
6. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-95 (196S).
7. Justice Brennan has been particularly sensitive to this problem and has stated that "[wjhen
agency action is challenged, standing, reviewability, and the merits pose discrete, and often
complicated, issues which can best be resolved by recognizing and treating them as such." Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 170 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting)
Professor Scott has suggested that decisions in cases involving standing should clearly distin-
guish between determinations made on constitutional grounds and those made on grounds of
judicial discretion. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 Harv L_
Rev. 645 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
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have denied standing in situations analogous both in terms of constitutional
and policy considerations to prior cases which held that the plaintiffs did have
standing.8 This inconsistency is particularly striking because the later cases
have involved alleged civil rights violations, traditionally an area of federal
judicial concern and one in which the Court had long construed standing
requirements in an exceedingly liberal manner. 9
Because the issue of standing turns upon prudential, as well as constitu-
tional considerations, the more recent decisions cannot be fully understood
without an examination of the role of the doctrine within the federal judiciary
and the manner in which it has been applied in recent years. Therefore this
Comment will first review the functions which standing performs. Secondly,
it will examine in depth how the doctrine has been applied in the post-1970
cases to carry out its most important function, that of defining the proper role
of the federal judiciary in our governmental system. Thirdly, it will discuss
the confusion, as exemplified by three recent cases, that has been caused by
the Court's failure to articulate clearly the relevant policy considerations
involved in the use of standing to define the scope of federal judicial power.
I. THE FUNCTIONS OF STANDING
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, has commented that "[g]eneraliza-
tions about standing to sue are largely worthless as such."'1 The doctrine of
standing has been applied to different cases by the Supreme Court with
glaring inconsistencies" in spite of the fact that it is considered a jurisdic-
tional requirement. 12 Although this suggests that any generalized discussion of
standing is of limited value, some indication of the scope of the problems
presented by the doctrine is essential to an understanding of the concept. "3
8. Compare United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975), and Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc). See part III-A(2) infra.
9. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). Although Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), did not involve a challenge under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970), as did Trafficante, it would not have been difficult for
the Court to extend the reasoning used in Trafficante to the factual situation presented in Warth,
especially in view of 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970) which states: "It is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."
10. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). Justice
Frankfurter has referred to the concept of standing as a "complicated specialty of federal
jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less determined by the
specific circumstances of individual situations .... " United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
11. Compare United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 197 (1956) (sua sponte
examination of respondent's standing) with Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,
345 U.S. 128, 129 n.1 (1953) (question of respondent's standing not raised by the parties, not
ruled on by the Court). See 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.18, at 291-92 (1958).
12. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). Insofar as standing is a jurisdictional require-
ment, it is incumbent upon federal courts to examine standing sua sponte. E.g., Cameron
v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 325 (1888); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, III U.S. 379, 383
(1884).
13. In spite of Justice Douglas' counsel, the Supreme Court has not been at all reticent to
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The gist of the question of standing is: "Have the appellants alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult . . questions?" 1 4 In theory, the
requirement of standing is an attempt to resolve the question of whether the
particular plaintiff before the court is the appropriate party, by virtue of
personal involvement, to seek a resolution on the merits of the case.' 5 In its
present form, the doctrine is regarded as a requirement of article III of the
Constitution, which restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases and
controversies." 1 6 Because standing is a jurisdictional requirement it is consid-
ered to be distinct from the merits of the case,1 7 and more properly regarded
as a "threshold requirement,"' 8 the negative determination of which precludes
consideration of the merits.' 9
Apart from its nature as an element of a "case or controversy," the Court
has also utilized the doctrine of standing as a tool to broaden its discretion in
speak generally on the subject. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975). Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-55 (1970).
14. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
15. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 156 (2d ed. 1973).
16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968). See note 7 supra. Commenting on the role
standing plays in the formulation of a justiciable controversy, Justice Frankfurter noted that "a
court will not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury
inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial determination is
consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial courts and the courts
of Westminster when the Constitution was framed." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (concurring opinion).
Various commentators have disagreed with this analysis and through a process of historical
interpretation have concluded that standing was not a requirement "of the courts of Westminster
when the Constitution was framed." Professor Jaffe has pointed out that until the administrative
reforms of 1832, the courts were the primary organ of centralized control in England and as such
were not at all loath to exercise their power even at the behest of a person who, by today's
standards, would be considered without standing. "I have encountered no case before 1807 in
which the standing of the plaintiff is mooted, though the lists of cases in the digests strongly
suggest the possibility that the plaintiff in some of them was without a personal interest-" Jaffe,
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1270 (1961) (footnote
omitted).
It has also been stated that "[a]lthough [standing] has been explained as a description of 'the
constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court to "cases" and "controversies," , it
apparently entered our law via Frothingham [v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1023)] ... " Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?. 78 Yale L.J. 81b, 818-19
(1969) (footnote omitted). This last statement, however, would appear to be somewhat question-
able in light of Liverpool, N.Y. & Phil. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33
(1885), which stated that the Court "has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State
or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called
upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies." Id. at 39.
17. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 t1970).
18. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974).
19. Id. at 504-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); International Longshoremen's Local 37
v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 223-24 (1954).
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deciding whether or not to pass judgment on the merits of a particular case. 20
Justice Powell has stated: "The doctrine of standing has always reflected
prudential as well as constitutional limitations. ' 21 However, in enunciating a
test for standing the Court rarely states what role both elements play in the
formulation of the test.
Due to its hybrid nature the concept of standing performs a number of
functions with varying degrees of propriety and efficiency. Because the
doctrine requires the existence of an active controversy between the parties, it
guarantees that "the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity,
that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the
litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the . . .
challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of
judicial resolution. '22 It further ensures that the relief sought, if granted, will
be "no broader than required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling
would be applied. '23 The theory is that by requiring plaintiff to be aggrieved,
he will have a strong interest in having the case decided in his favor.
Consequently, he will present a better argument to the court than one who
has not been injured by the defendant's action and, therefore, would not
receive any benefit from the exercise of the court's remedial power.2 4 More-
over, since the judiciary must rely almost exclusively on the information put
before it by the litigants, the higher quality of argument presented by such a
plaintiff should result in better reasoned decisions.
25
Standing also limits a federal court's remedial powers even when they are
exercised on behalf of the plaintiff. The requirement of a "personal stake" on
the part of the plaintiff ensures that the court's powers will be employed only
to the extent necessary to protect that stake. Thus, the doctrine guards against
" 'government by injunction' ",26 by reserving the formidable powers of the
judiciary for the occasions when their exercise is essential to remedy a
particular plaintiffs injury.
Although these justifications of the standing doctrine would seem correct in
the majority of cases, they are not without deficiencies. First, because
litigation is an expensive process, it would seem that any individual who is
willing to bear the cost has at least as much motivation to present a good
argument on the merits as one who is aggrieved by the challenged action. "If
20. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 117-18 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Bickell;
Bickel, The Supreme Court-1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40,
42-47 (1961).
21. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 n. 18 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). That
standing is a hybrid requirement, i.e., that there is a minimal constitutional requirement and a
higher court-imposed requirement, is made clear by the fact that "Congress may grant an express
right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course,
Art. III's requirement remains .... ." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
22. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
23. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
24. Id. at 221.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 222.
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plaintiff did not have the minimal personal involvement and adverseness
which Article I requires, he would not be engaging in the costly pursuit of
litigation." 27 Secondly, by making the syllogism turn on the expected quality
of the argument, it is at least conceivable that the same logic could be used to
support the denial of a hearing in any case where it was expected the
argument would be poor, a manifestly unjust result.3 Thirdly, even when the
plaintiff does have the requisite "personal stake," decisions of the Court often
have ramifications far beyond the protection of that interest.2 9 Although the
propriety of the Court's ruling in such a case may be questioned, the ability of
a judicial body to make such decisions remains unaffected by the character of
the plaintiff's interest.
A third function served by standing is to limit the demands made on the
courts.3 0 Professor Scott points out that the user of judicial services does not
bear the full cost of the service. Thus, greater demands are placed on the
judiciary than if those services were unsubsidized. 3 1 Professor Scott con-
cludes, however, that standing, as opposed to legislative limitations on court
access, is an unwieldy tool to limit the demand for judicial resources. A judge
is without criteria for determining which plaintiffs should be granted sub-
sidized access. "Nor is he instructed as to the very raison d'itre of that
subsidy-whether it is concerned with income distribution and the lot of the
poor, or with the external benefits and transaction costs associated with
bringing representative actions, or with some combination of both.1
32
The fourth, and probably most controversial, function served by the
doctrine is to limit the role of the judiciary in a representative form of
government. 33 Standing acts as a limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction by
the federal courts and, as such, tends to minimize friction with other branches
of the federal government and with the states. 34 The Supreme Court is well
aware that it is entrusted with broad powers which, if improperly used, could
'ultimately lead to an anti-majoritarian form of government. 35 As a result, the
Court generally exercises a great deal of prudence in "deciding to decide."
36
To guard against the dangers of an overly active judiciary, the Court has
27. Scott, supra note 7, at 674.
28. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 298 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (criticism of Law of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 237, (now 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970)) as
enabling the "skill of counsel" to determine whether a particular state court decision will be
reviewed on appeal as a matter of right or on certiorari as a matter of discretion).
29. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
30. Scott, supra note 7, at 670-83.
31. Id. at 670-71. See generally Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload
and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 335 (1975).
32. Scott, supra note 7, at 682.
33. Id. at 683.
34. Bickel, supra note 20, at 116.
35. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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enunciated a number of other doctrines which aid in determining whether a
case is justiciable.3 7 These "avoidance" techniques include the concepts of
ripeness, 38 reviewability, 39 political question, 40 and mootness, 4 1 as well as the
prohibitions against collusive suits42 and advisory opinions.43 Like standing,
all these doctrines theoretically are based on the case or controversy require-
ment of article Ill. Yet in decisions involving these concepts there are often
unspoken considerations concerning both the power of the federal judiciary
vis-4-vis the legislative and executive branches, and the proper role of the
federal judiciary in the division of power between the federal and state
governments. 44 Moreover, the foundation of an avoidance doctrine in article
III does little to clarify the limits of the concept when, as with standing, the
doctrine is accorded a prudential, as well as a constitutional dimension. Thus,
the use of the doctrine of standing to maintain the separation of powers and to
limit federal judicial intrusion into traditional state concerns is particularly
troublesome. As Chief Justice Warren noted:
Standing has been called one of "the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain
of public law." Some of the complexities peculiar to standing problems result because
standing "serves, on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all the various elements of
justiciability." In addition, there are at work in the standing doctrine the many subtle
pressures which tend to cause policy considerations to blend into constitutional
limitations. 45
In its recent major standing cases, the Court has often failed to acknowl-
edge the differing policy considerations involved when an individual seeks to
challenge (1) the decision of a federal administrative agency; (2) a spending or
regulatory statute of Congress which does not directly affect the plaintiff
37. "Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation [that
federal courts only decide questions presented in an adversary context and that they do not rule in
cases which are more properly determined by another branch of government] placed upon federal
courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
38. E.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); International Longshoremen's Local 37 v.
Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); New Jersey v. Sargent,
269 U.S. 328 (1926).
39. E.g., Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960); Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267
U.S. 175 (1925); United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 U.S. 638 (1918); ICC v.
United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912).
40. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Octjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S, 427 (1893);
Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856).
41. E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13
(1922); Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468 (1917); Richardson v. MeChesney, 218 U.S. 487 (19101.
42. E.g., Moore v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971) (per curiam); United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (per curiam); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Lord
v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 250 (1850).
43. E.g., Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); Alabama v.
Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934);.Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 408 (1792).
44. Scott, supra note 7, at 683.
45. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (footnotes omitted). See note 7 supra.
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except insofar as the plaintiff is a taxpayer; (3) a state or local ordinance; or (4)
the failure to enforce a clearly announced federal poUcy. 4 6 In all these cases,
the question of standing has been dealt with in radically different manners.
Although the doctrine always demands some injury to the plaintiff, the
requisite degree, directness, and singularity of the plaintiff's injury vary
greatly depending on the Court's frequently unstated assessment of the
competing policy considerations involved in each case.
47
IE. IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY: 1970-74
Prior to 1970, a number of different tests were used to determine standing.
To challenge the decision of an administrative agency, a plaintiff would, at
times, have to allege the violation of a legally protected interest, 48 while in
other instances, an allegation of injury-in-fact would suffice.4 9 In order for a
federal taxpayer, suing as a taxpayer, to have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal statute, a complicated, two-part "nexus" had to
be met."° For a state citizen to have standing to enjoin the enforcement or
non-enforcement of a state statute, he had to show that he would be directly
affected by the relief sought.51
During the years from 1970 to 1974, the Court ruled in a number of
standing cases,5 2 in which some of these tests were modified, other reaf-
firmed. Several of the decisions applied seemingly inconsistent tests to deter-
mine standing. However, the cases can be reconciled if the standing tests are
viewed primarily as tools used to implement the policies which the Court
found determinative in each case. This section will examine a number of cases
from this period and suggest how policy considerations affected the Court's
holding on the issue of standing.
A. Standing Under the Administrative Procedure Act:
Data Processing and Barlow
A significant change in the law of federal standing occurred in 1970 in the
cases of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp5 3
and Barlow v. Collins.5 4 In Data Processing plaintiffs sought to challenge a
46. This is an illustrative rather than an exhaustive list of the situations in which policy
affects the determination of standing.
47. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. IS0, 157 (1970); Evans
v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589, 609 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
48. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
49. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
50. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
51. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruc., 368 U.S. 278, 283 (1961). See notes 85-86 infra and
accompanying text.
52. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 20S (1972);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
53. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
54. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
19761
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ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency which would have allowed national
banks to provide data processing services to other banks and their customers.
In Barlow, tenant farmers attacked a ruling of the Secretary of Agriculture
which would have permitted landlords to require that their tenant farmers
assign their benefits under the federal uplands cottom program as a condition
to working on the landlord's land, thereby forcing the tenants to buy all their
farm needs from the landlord at inflated prices. In both cases, standing was
predicated on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which provides that
"[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."5 s
Speaking for the Court in both cases, Justice Douglas promulgated a two-
part test by which to judge the standing of a litigant who seeks to challenge
the decision of an administrative agency: (1) the plaintiff must allege "that the
challenged [agency] action has caused him injury in fact, economic or oth-
erwise;"'5 6 and (2) "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
[must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 5 7
In so holding, the Court changed the prior law of standing to challenge
agency action by blurring the distinction between what had been referred to
as statutory and non-statutory review. Formerly, there had existed
[a] central distinction in the field of standing... between judicial review of an act or
decision of a government official or agency which Congress has expressly provided
shall be subject to review in the courts by some prescribed proceeding [statutory
review], and judicial review obtained by invoking some general jurisdictional grant or
remedy not related to the specific governmental action or decision being challenged
[non-statutory review]. 58
Before Data Processing and Barlow, two different tests were used to deter-
mine the plaintiff's standing to challenge the decision of an administrative
agency. Where a statute specifically provided for the review of the action by
the particular agency 59 in question, the requirement was that of injury-in-
fact. 60 Where there was no such statute, the plaintiff had to allege the
55. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
56. 397 U.S. at 152.
57. Id. at 153.
58. Scott, supra note 7, at 647-48 (footnotes omitted).
59. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) (1970) (review of orders of the SEC under the Investment
Company Act of 1940); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970) (review of final orders of NLRB); 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(bX6) (1970) (review of FCC orders and decisions); 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970) (review of CAB
orders).
60. "In the field of standing for statutory review, the controversial question became not how
high to set the requirements but how low." Scott, supra note 7, at 657. See Private Actions, supra
note 1, at 272-87; Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning in the Federal Courts,
17 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 347, 357-58 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Zoning]. At
least two cases held that plaintiffs seeking judicial review of agency action had standing solely as
representatives of the public. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942);
Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707
(1943) (per curiam).
[Vol. 45
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violation of a legal interest-"one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers
a privilege." 61 Until the decision in Data Processing, the APA had been
considered merely a codification of these tests, 62 providing for the application
of the appropriate standard in both statutory and nonstatutory review situa-
tions. However, in Data Processing the Court held the legal interest test
inappropriate to determine the threshold question of standing because that
test went to the merits of the case. 63 Thus, the new standard enunciated in
Data Processing appeared to abolish the distinction between statutory and
non-statutory review, 64 substituting a single test for standing to be applied in
any case brought under the APA. 65
At first blush, it would appear that Data Processing and Barlow stand for
the proposition of increased judicial review of the actions of executive
agencies. Certainly, the cases liberalized the conditions under which judicial
review will be granted. But it should be noted that this liberalization of
standing requirements occurred in cases where federal policy strongly favored
increased judicial review.
Both cases concerned an agency's interpretation of a statute, 66 a matter
which " 'does not significantly engage the agency's expertise. . . . [and] on
which courts, and not [administrators], are relatively more expert.' ",67 Since
neither case addressed particularly delicate matters within the agency's special
expertise, judicial review would not result in a significant arrogation of
powers more properly within the province of the agency. Moreover, even
though the action of the agency was presumptively subject to judicial re-
view, 6 8 in the trial of the substantive issues the determination of an agency is
61. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). Accord, Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S.
464, 479 (1938).
62. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972); Kansas City Power & light Co. v.
McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 931-32 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); Atchison, T. & S.F
Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76, 78 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 892 t95); Private
Actions, supra note 1, at 287; Scott, supra note 7, at 658.
63. 397 U.S. at 153. Accord, 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.04, at 217 (1958)
("Circular reasoning is very common, for one of the questions asked in order to determine
whether a plaintiff has standing is whether the plaintiff has a legal right, but the question
whether the plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion, for if the plaintiff has standing his
interest is a legally-protected interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right."); C. Wright,
Federal Courts § 13, at 43 (2d ed. 1970).
64. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
65. See Scott, supra note 7, at 668; Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 60, at 359
66. Data Processing involved the Comptroller's interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964)
which provides that "[n]o bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the
performance of bank services for banks." Barlow involved the Secretary of Agriculture's interpre-
tation of 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g) (1964), which permits participants in the upland cotton program to
assign payments thereunder only "as security for cash or advances to finance making a crop."
67. 397 U.S. at 166, quoting Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
68. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
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accorded great deference. 69 Thus, although the Court asserted the right to
oversee an agency's construction of a statute, such oversight in no way
constitutes interference with a co-equal branch of government. To the con-
trary, the opinions in both cases can be read as indicating deference to
Congress. In both cases, the statutes involved tended to serve as a check on
the powers of the executive agencies in question. By asserting its power to
review the acts of the agency, the Court was basically seeking to apply those
restrictions Congress had seen fit to impose. In an analogous situation, it has
been stated that "[t]here is need for judicial action ...[when] an agency of
the Executive Branch fails to carry out [a] legislative mandate. The contrary
would give the Executive a silent veto not provided in the Constitution. '70
Under this analysis, the decisions in Data Processing and Barlow seem not an
expansion of power but rather a fulfillment of the traditional federal judicial
function of mediation between the coordinate branches of the federal govern-
ment. 71
B. Non-APA Standing: Trafficante and Linda R.S.
In 1972 and 1973 the Court decided two standing cases72 in which strong
policy considerations played a determinative role in the Court's decisions.
Neither of these cases was brought under the APA and both involved
substantive issues unlike those in Data Processing and Barlow. As a result,
the Court approached the standing question in a different manner than it had
in those rulings.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 73 two tenants (one
black and one white) of an apartment complex had filed a complaint with
HUD, alleging that the owner of their apartment complex had discriminated
against non-whites in violation of Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 74
thereby depriving the tenants of "the social benefits of living in an integrated
community; . .. [and causing them] embarrassment and economic damage in
social, business, and professional activities from being 'stigmatized' as resi-
dents of a 'white ghetto.' "Is In addition, a statute provided for judicial review
at the request of "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice .... "76
On the face of the complaint, plaintiffs' standing was, at the very least,
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18
(1965).
70. Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589, 611 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
71. See Bickel, supra note 20, at 26-33; A. Mason & W. Beaney, The Supreme Court In a
Free Society 28-68 (1959).
72. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972).
73. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
75. 409 U.S. at 208. Professor Davis has characterized these allegations of injury as
"[slornething like an abstract interest. ... K. D~avis, Administrative Law of the Seventies
§ 22.02-5 (1976).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
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questionable. First, there was no indication in the opinion that the landlord
had discriminated against specific blacks who would have been able to move
into the complex but for the discriminatory practices (i.e., no allegation was
made that there was an absence of blacks in the complex for non-economic
reasons). Unless this was the case, plaintiffs would not derive any benefit
from the relief sought, and logically it could therefore be said that their injury
was not caused by the defendant's actions. Thus, it could be argued that any
benefit the plaintiffs would receive from a favorable adjudication on the
merits would be dependent on the acts of third parties (i.e., non-whites). It
could be argued further that the primary goal of Title VIII was to benefit
those who had been discriminated against. Therefore, it could be said that the
plaintiffs were also attempting to raise the rights of third parties, a practice
traditionally barred by prudential rules of standing. 77
However, a unanimous Court did find that the plaintiffs in Trafficante had
standing. The Court stated that plaintiffs had alleged injury-in-fact and that
the broad definition of "person aggrieved" in the statute was indicative of" 'a
congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article
I of the Constitution.' "78 The Court went on to point out that since the
Attorney General lacked the resources to prosecute adequately all claims
arising under Title VIII, "the main generating force must be private suits in
which . . . the complainants act not only on their own behalf but also 'as
private attorneys general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to
be of the highest priority.' ",79 That such was the intent of Congress was
supported by the legislative history of the statute which indicated a belief on
the part of Congress that " 'the whole community' "80 is victimized by a
landlord's discriminatory practices.
The following year, however, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D. 8 1 the Court was
unwilling to apply the same liberal standards to determine whether plaintiff
had standing. In that case the mother of an illegitimate child sought to enjoin
77. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). However, at times the Court has waived the application
of this rule. In its most recent statement on the issue, the Court pointed out that the relevant
factors to be considered are the relationship between the litigant and the third party, and the
probability of the third party's ever being able to raise the rights effectively. Singleton v. Wulff,
96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976) (doctor seeking to challenge exclusion of elective abortions under state
medicaid program allowed to raise the rights of his patients); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96
S. Ct. 2831 (1976) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (doctor convicted of
aiding in the use of contraceptives allowed to raise the rights of his married patients); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 248 (1953) (white defendant sued for breach of racially restrictive covenant
allowed to raise the rights of blacks); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (private and
parochial schools suing to enjoin enforcement of statute requiring all parents to send their
children to public schools allowed to raise the rights of parents). See generally Sedler, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 Yale L.J. 599 (1962).
78. 409 U.S. at 209, quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 46 (3d Cir. 1971).
79. 409 U.S. at 211.
80. Id., quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 2706 (1968) (remarks of Senator Javits).
81. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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what she contended was the discriminatory application and enforcement of a
provision of the Texas Penal Code8 2 which provided for criminal penalties for
a husband who failed to support his minor child. Plaintiff alleged that the
father of her illegitimate child had failed in his duty of support and argued
that the refusal of the state to enforce the provision against him was violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Under the decision in Trafficante, in which the question of causation was
not very clearly examined, it would seem that the plaintiff should have had
standing. The injury was much more concrete than that alleged in Traf-
ficante. Moreover, the claim of causation in Linda R.S. was relatively
convincing8 3 since the very statute in question was based on the assumption
that "criminal sanctions are useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their support
obligations to their legitimate children. '8 4 Under this rationale, the plaintiff in
Linda R.S. would arguably have been benefited had the relief sought been
granted.
However, Justice Marshall, speaking for a majority of five, found plaintiff
lacked the requisite standing because there was insufficient causal connection
"between her injury and the government action which she attack[ed]. . . .,,
The majority viewed the statute as creating a completed offense as soon as the
father failed to provide support, with his subsequent actions having no effect
on the penalty imposed. The ultimate benefit of enforcement to the plaintiff
was therefore dependent upon the actions of a third party not before the
Court. Thus, the relief sought was described as "speculative, '8 6 since it could
not be said that but for the non-enforcement of the statute, the plaintiff would
be benefited.
In both Trafficante and Linda R.S., the benefit of the relief sought was
ultimately dependent upon the acts of third parties. In Trafficante the Court
ignored this point. Yet in Linda R.S. this factor was held to be determinative
in the Court's finding that the plaintiff lacked standing. Despite the seeming
inconsistency in the Court's analysis, an examination of the vastly different
policy considerations in these two cases suggests an underlying rationale for
the results reached by the Court in both rulings. In Trafficante the plaintiffs
were seeking to enforce a federal statute, and since the remedy was sought
82. Law of May 25, 1959, ch. 222, [1959) Tex. Laws 504 (repealed 1973).
83. "I had always thought our civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanctions had
something more than a 'speculative' effect on a person's conduct." 410 U.S. at 621 (White, J.,
dissenting).
It has been argued that were it not for this deterrent effect, state criminal laws might be
without a rational basis sufficient to pass constitutional muster. See Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct.
2909, 2931 (1976).
84. 410 U.S. at 621 (White, J., dissenting). That the statute's effect was intended to be
coercive is made clear from Adams v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 615, 361 S.W.2d 877 (1962)
(conviction could not be sustained absent proof that defendant was financially able to support
minor children) and Rainwater v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 88, 141 S.W.2d 364 (1940) (proof that
father provided support to the best of his ability allowed as an affirmative defense).
85. 410 U.S. at 617-18.
86. Id. at 618.
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against a private individual, judicial action would not result in a confronta-
tion with a coordinate branch of the federal government or interference with a
state's application of its own laws. Secondly, a statute specifically provided
for the bringing of civil actions to eliminate discrimination in housing,
indicating that Congress intended a concerted federal attack on the prob-
lem.87 Thirdly, the case involved a question of discrimination on the basis of
race, which, apart from any particular statutory program, has long been a
ground for special scrutiny by the Court.88 Finally, since the ability of HUD
and the Attorney General to enforce the statute was minimal, and there was
no immediate prospect that this situation would change, a failure to find that
the plaintiffs had standing would result in a frustration of congressional intent
where the federal statute had arguably been violated.
On the other hand, in Linda R.S. the relief sought would have required the
Court to interfere directly with a state's application and enforcement of its
own laws, a particularly sensitive area. The Supreme Court and Congress
have traditionally recognized that the states possess broad powers in terms of
the substance and application of their laws. 89 The federal policy is, therefore,
one of deference to state regulation of local matters. Thus, it is consistent for
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
88. The federal policy against racial discrimination has been the subject of both judicial and
legislative action since the post-Civil War period. Shortly after its adoption, the fourteenth
amendment was interpreted as protecting only blacks. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1872). Even in situations where the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment do not apply, it
has been held that it would be inconsistent with the policy of the United States for the judiciary to
rule in a manner contrary to the result in situations where the prohibitions did apply. Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948). Moreover, in cases arising under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, classifications based on race have been held to be "suspect" and
subject "to the most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), thus
demanding a "very heavy burden of justification," Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
The Supreme Court has consistently vindicated the general policy of eliminating racial
segregation. E.g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (retroactive application of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to state criminal trespass proceedings); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (racially separate but "equal" treatment in public schools prohibited); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (racially restrictive covenants unenforceable at law); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racially restrictive covenants unenforceable in equity).
Congress has also attacked racial discrimination through the enactment of a number of
statutes. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970) (civil rights cases removable to federal courts); the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.); the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (Supp. V. 197S).
89. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 599, 603 (1862); Elmendorf v. Taylor,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159-60 (1825); 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970) (state laws as rules of decision);
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (three-judge court needed to enjoin enforcement of state statute as
unconstitutional); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (general prohibition against federal courts enjoining
proceedings in state courts). Of course, this deference to the states lies at the heart of the federalist
system. See U. S. Const. amends. X, XI. See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, H.
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 691-718 (2d ed. 1973).
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the Court to impose more stringent requirements to determine the standing of
a plaintiff seeking to challenge state or local laws.
The Court even admitted that the plaintiff in Linda R.S. did "have an
interest in the support of her child. But given the special status . . ." which
the Court accords to state criminal prosecutions, plaintiff had failed to show
"a direct nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of
the State's criminal laws." 90 Moreover, Linda R.S. was decided at a time
when the Court was re-evaluating the role of federal equity jurisdiction with
regard to state criminal proceedings and had recently established a trend
toward less federal interference in this area. 9 1 Admittedly, Linda R.S.
involved a classification based on illegitimacy-a legislative practice which
has been carefully scrutinized by the Court in recent years. 92 Yet such
classifications have not been reviewed as rigorously as those based on race. 93
Furthermore, the refusal of standing to this particular plaintiff would not
necessarily mean that the statute in question would be immune from constitu-
tional challenge, since such a challenge could be brought by one convicted
under the statute. Finally, the challenged statute was repealed three months
after the Court's ruling in a total revamping of the Texas Criminal Code.
94
Although there is no indication in the opinion that this factor was taken into
account, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the members of the
Court knew that the Texas legislature was considering the repeal of the
statute and, therefore, did not want to interfere in a delicate matter that could
shortly be rendered moot by legislative action. 95
Hence, in Trafficante, many policy considerations militated in favor of a
finding of standing, while in Linda R.S. similar considerations weighed
against such a finding. Thus, the Court overlooked the question of causation
in Trafficante although it was the focal point of the decision in Linda R.S. It
would seem, therefore, that by varying the requisite degree of causation, the
Court had utilized a convenient tool to implement policies while ostensibly
deciding questions of jurisdiction.
The difficulty, however, with the use of causation in this context is the
90. 410 U.S. at 619 (emphasis added).
91. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
92. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
93. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S, 532,
538-39 (1971).
94. Law of June 14, 1973, ch. 399, §§ I (enacting a new Penal Code), 3(a) (repealing Art.
602), [1973] Tex. Laws 883-990, 992. Under the revised Texas Penal Code, nonsupport of
both legitimate and illegitimate children is specifically prohibited. Tex. Rev. Penal Code Ann.
§ 25.05(d) (1974).
95. The possibility of the Court's having knowledge of the impending repeal of the challenged
statute is evidenced by the fact that the repeal of the statute in question was part of the total
revamping of the Texas Penal Code., In all probability, such a major revision was under
consideration by the Texas Legislature well before the Court's decision.
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failure of the Court to distinguish the underlying considerations which jus-
tified the apparently conflicting results in Linda R.S. and Trafficante. While
it appears that the above-stated policy factors motivated the Court to require
different degrees of causation in these cases, the Court's failure to place the
holdings explicitly on such policy grounds has led to the application of the
Linda R.S. "but for"96 standard in what are essentially Trafficante situations.
As a result, subsequent rulings have seemed logically inconsistent and the
policies suggested as the rationale for Trafficante have been thwarted.
C. Taxpayer and Citizen Standing:
Richardson and Schlesinger
In 1974 the Court decided two major standing cases97 involving the
question of whether a federal taxpayer, without showing more than his status
as taxpayer, could challenge the failure of Congress to comply with certain
provisions of the Constitution. The second case also addressed the issue of
whether standing could be predicated on a citizen's interest in having Con-
gress comply with the Constitution. In both cases, the Court failed to find
standing, primarily due to considerations of the proper role of the judiciary
within the federal government. As is evident in both opinions, the application
of liberalized standing requirements to plaintiffs who predicate standing on their
status as taxpayers or as citizens could have far reaching effects in altering the
balance of power within the federal government. Therefore, the Court is more
sensitive to policy considerations in the areas of taxpayer and citizen standing
than in any other type of standing case. Hence, these decisions are properly
considered as being sui generis and great caution should be exercised before
attempting to transpose the principles in these rulings to cases which deal
with standing in other contexts.
In United States v. Richardson98 a federal taxpayer brought suit seeking to
enjoin the publication of the Treasury Department's "Combined Statement of
Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the United States Government" on
the ground that it did not fulfill the requirements of article I, section 9 of the
Constitution,9 9 and to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to publish a full
accounting of the receipts and expenditures of the CIA. 0 0 In Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War'0 1 plaintiffs attempted to challenge the
membership in the Armed Forces Reserves of certain members of Congress as
96. See part II-A(2) infra.
97. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
98. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
99. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."
100. In effect, the suit was a challenge to the constitutionality of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403 et seq. (1970), which requires an accounting from the CIA "solely on
the certificate of the Director .... "50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (1970).
101. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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violative of the incompatibility clause of the Constitution. 10 2 Standing was
predicated on plaintiffs' status both as taxpayers and as citizens. The alleged
injury was that "Reserve membership by Members of Congress . . . 'deprives
or may deprive the individual named plaintiffs and all other citizens and
taxpayers of the United States of the faithful discharge by members of
Congress who are members of the Reserves of their duties as members of
Congress, to which all citizens and taxpayers are entitled.' "1103
In both cases, the plaintiffs were trying to expand the holding of Flast v.
Cohen, 104 which held that a federal taxpayer qua taxpayer could sue to enjoin
allegedly unconstitutional federal spending programs provided she showed: (1)
that there was a logical link between the plaintiff's status as taxpayer and the
program sought to be challenged, i.e., the challenged expenditures had to be
part of a spending program rather than expenditures incidental to an essen-
tially regulatory program, and (2) that there was a logical link between the
plaintiff's status as a taxpayer and the constitutional provision alleged to have
been violated, i.e., it must be alleged that the Government is spending money
in violation of specific constitutional limitations on its spending powers., -
Since Mrs. Flast was challenging a spending program 0 6 and since she
alleged that money was being spent in violation of a specific constitutional
limitation, 0 7 she was found to have standing as a federal taxpayer to
challenge a spending program of the federal government.
102. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 provides that "no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."
103. 418 U.S. at 212, quoting respondent's petition for certiorari at 46.
104. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
105. Id. at 102-03. A brief examination of the problems of the Flast "nexus" test indicates that
the Court in Flast was considering a good deal more than the plaintiff's "personal stake in the
outcome." First, the decision stated that standing involves both constitutional and prudential
considerations, id. at 97, yet the Court did not state whether the two-part "nexus" test states a
constitutional or prudential rule. Secondly, the Court also made clear that standing involves a
question distinct from the merits, id. at 99, yet the application of the test announced requires at
least a cursory investigation of the merits of the case. Thirdly, and most troublesome, is the fact
that the second part of the test requires that the plaintiff allege a violation of "specific
constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending
power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by
Art. I, § 8." Id. at 103. The Court also characterized the role standing plays as essentially that of
plaintiff selection. Id. It would seem that if standing can be properly characterized as a plaintiff
selection device, the specificity of the constitutional limitations should be totally irrelevant to the
"threshold" question of standing because the specificity of the limitation does not relate to
whether or not the plaintiff has a "personal stake" in the outcome. If anything, the requirement
that the plaintiff invoke a specific constitutional limitation seems much more related to the
problems encountered with political questions (those of "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) than those which should be the proper
subject of consideration when the standing of one of the litigants is brought into question, 392
U.S. at 123-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106. Mrs. Flast sought to enjoin expenditures under the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 241a et seq. (Supp. II, 1964). 392 U.S. at 85.
107. The spending program was alleged to be violative of the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the first amendment. 392 U.S. at 85-86.
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Substantively, there were important distinctions between Flast on the one
hand and Richardson and Schlesinger on the other. The statute under attack
in Flast provided for federal aid to schools, both public and private.' 08 The
Court has traditionally perceived the establishment clause as erecting" 'a wall
of separation between church and State.' "109 In the Court's view, the failure
to maintain this wall would lead to divisiveness between sects, the very thing
sought to be avoided by the first amendment.110 Richardson, however,
involved a challenge to the statutes regulating the CIA, an agency whose
activities are related to the war-making powers of Congress. Judicial interven-
tion in this instance would result in a direct confrontation between the
coordinate branches of the federal government in sensitive areas where great
latitude must be accorded the powers of Congress and the Executive in order
for those powers to be effective."' Similarly, Schlesinger involved a direct
challenge to a coordinate branch. The Court there did not reach the question
of whether the qualifications of members of Congress present a "political
question."'1 2 Nevertheless, the issue is a highly sensitive one in which it
appears that the best course for the Court is to decide not to decide absent a
clear showing of the need for adjudication.
In denying standing to the plaintiffs in both Richardson and Schlesinger,
the Court applied the two-part Flast test. It found that since neither case
involved a Congressional spending program, there was no logical link be-
tween the status of taxpayer and the claim sought to be adjudicated. In
Schlesinger the Court also dealt with the question of standing predicated on
citizenship. On this point the court ruled that one who suffered an abstract,
speculative injury in a manner undifferentiated from that suffered by all
citizens was not entitled to judicial review of the sensitive constitutional
questions presented in the case:
In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was meant to serve the interests of
all [citizens]. Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a 'case
or controversy' appropriate for judicial resolution. The proposition that all constitu-
tional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate
beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries."13
It is noteworthy that in both cases the Court to some degree indicated its
sensitivity to the delicate policy questions involved. The Court addressed the
argument that if the plaintiffs in Richardson and Schlesinger lacked standing
no one would be able to challenge the alleged violation of the Constitution.
108. The constitutionality of a very similar state statute was affirmed the same day Flast was
decided. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The constitutionality of the statute
involved in Flast was affirmed in Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), modified, 422 U.S.
1004 (1975).
109. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
110. 330 U.S. at 51-53 (Rutiedge, J., dissenting).
111. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944); see also cases cited at note 40 supra.
112. 418 U.S. at 215-16.
113. Id. at 226-27 (footnote omitted).
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The Court found that such a circumstance does not necessarily militate in
favor of a finding of standing, but rather "gives support to the argument that
the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ulti-
mately to the political process."' 14 The Court further asserted that although
extremely liberal taxpayer and citizen standing might be appropriate in a
direct democracy, it would be inconsistent with our representative form of
government.1 1 s Moreover, the Court commented, firm standing limitations
are a practical necessity in order to check the ever increasing workload of the
federal courts. 116
However, while the Court did indicate those policies which it considered in
determining the standing issue, the opinions failed to distinguish prior cases.
The injury-in-fact in Richardson and Schlesinger seems at least as non-
speculative as the injury in Trafficante, and the zone of interest test enun-
ciated in Data Processing could also have been met in both cases. 117 It would
have been preferable, therefore, if the Court had acknowledged this apparent
discrepancy and emphasized that the standards used in Schlesinger and
Richardson were tailored to cases raising delicate questions of constitutional
adjudication. Under such an approach, the requirements in those cases of
particular, concrete, direct, non-generalized injury"" would be properly
understood as prudential limitations which apply to certain constitutional
challenges and which should be of lesser importance in, for example, situa-
tions involving review of agency action.1 19 As one commentator has sug-
gested:
The Court's insistence that standing requires a concrete, differentiated injury should
not be understood as an attempt to redefine the minimum requirement of injury under
article III. Rather, it should be seen as a reflection of prudential considerations
peculiarly applicable to citizen suits brought to enforce general mandates of the
Constitution. 120
D. APA Standing Revisited:
Sierra Club and SCRAP
As was stated above, 1 21 the decisions in Data Processing and Barlow
seemed to lessen the requirements of standing to sue under the APA. In Sierra
Club v. Morton 22 and United States v. SCRAP 123 the Court had an opportu-
114. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
115. Id. at 179-80.
116. Id. at 179.
117. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 239 (1974); see notes 73-77 supra
and accompanying text.
118. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974).
119. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 242-43 (1974). But see part II-B
infra.
120. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 243 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
121. See part II-A supra.
122. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
123. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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nity to apply the test enunciated in Data Processing. In these two cases, the
requirements of standing to challenge agency action under the Data Process-
ing test were held to be quite minimal. Moreover, an examination of these
two cases suggests that, in the absence of countervailing policy considerations,
the Court should not apply the more rigid standards established in Linda
R.S., Richardson and Schlesinger. 124
In Sierra Club, an environmental interest group attempted to challenge a
decision by the Forest Service which permitted the commercial development
of Mineral King Valley. In spite of the fact that the members of the Sierra
Club appeared to use the area in question,1 25 the plaintiff did not allege this.
Rather, the Sierra Club sued as an organization with a special interest in
conservation, predicating its standing on the APA, 126 apparently in the hope
of being recognized as a private attorney general.
Finding that plaintiff lacked standing, the Court acknowledged that aesthet-
ic injury would be sufficient injury-in-fact to find standing under the APA,
but emphasized that "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding
the interest and no matter how qualified the organization in evaluating the
problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely
affected' or 'aggrieved' within the meaning of the APA."' 2' Hence, under
Sierra Club interest alone does not equal injury sufficient for a finding of APA
standing, in spite of the liberalization which took place in Data Processing
and Barlow. 128
In SCRAP, the plaintiffs, environmental interest groups, sought to chal-
lenge an ICC ruling which allowed railroads to charge a 2.5%c surcharge on
freight rates. They alleged that the increase:
would discourage the use of "recyclable" materials, and promote the use of new raw
materials that compete with scrap, thereby adversely affecting the environment by
encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering, and other extractive activities. The
members of these environmental groups were allegedly forced to pay more for finished
products, and their use of forests and streams was allegedly impaired because of
124. Although the continued vitality of SCRAP has apparently been called into question by
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976), it is noteworthy that the Court
in Eastern Kentucky distinguished rather than questioned the decision in SCRAP. Id. at 1927
n.25. Moreover, the ruling in Eastern Kentucky is subject to criticism because the Court there
apparently failed to acknowledge the policy considerations involved when agency action is
challenged under the APA. Id. at 1934 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 252-63 infra.
125. From an amici curiae brief filed in the case it would appear that the members of the
Sierra Club actually did use the area. 405 U.S. at 735 n.8.
126. 405 U.S. at 730.
127. Id. at 739.
128. The opinion in Sierra Club is equally interesting for what it does not say. The Court
cites five cases in which interest, without a showing of injury, was sufficient for standing to be
found. The Court does recognize that standing is a jurisdictional requirement, yet surprisingly it
cites these cases without condemnation and, indeed, without comment. 405 U.S. at 738 n. 13.
For a discussion of the problems involved in allowing special interest groups to have standing
absent a showing of injury, see Scott, supra note 7, at 680-81.
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unnecessary destruction of timber and extraction of raw materials, and the accumula-
tion of otherwise recyclable solid and liquid waste materials.' 2 9
Plaintiffs sought standing under the APA, alleging that the ICC had failed
to file an environmental impact statement as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.130 Despite the attenuated chain of causa-
tion, it was held that the plaintiffs in SCRAP did have standing. The Court
noted that the crucial difference between SCRAP and Sierra Club was that
the plaintiffs in SCRAP alleged that they did in fact use the area that was
allegedly affected by the ruling.13 1 A comparison of these two cases indicates
that although the Court was willing to apply liberalized standing require-
ments in situations involving challenges to agency action,132 it remained
unwilling to remove the requirement of injury-in-fact altogether.
Apart from its relationship to Sierra Club, the decision in SCRAP provides
an illuminating contrast to the manner in which standing was handled in
several other cases. The major difficulty with the alleged injury in SCRAP is
the extremely attenuated causal connection between the injury alleged and the
specific action challenged. First, the rate increase was general and, as such, it
should not have affected recyclable goods differently from virgin goods. 1
33
Secondly, the injury alleged would really stem from the practices of manufac-
turers and not from the rate increase in question. In view of these two factors
it would seem that plaintiffs' injury was speculative. Moreover, in Linda
R.S., decided just three months earlier, a plaintiff was found to lack standing
absent a showing that but for the defendant's actions, she would not be
injured. Without distinguishing or even citing Linda R.S., the Court indi-
cated that the question of causation should be left for the trial on the merits,
or at the very earliest, considered in a motion for summary judgment. While
conceding that plaintiffs' pleading must be "more than an ingenious academic
exercise in the conceivable," the Court was satisfied that in the case at bar
plaintiffs had asserted "a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished
them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were
claimed to be affected." 34 It would seem that the only convincing explanation
for these divergent approaches is to be found in policy considerations underly-
ing the issues in each case. Since SCRAP involved a challenge to agency
action, which is presumptively subject to review, 13 5 the Court required only
that the allegation of causation be more than an "academic exercise in the
conceivable." When, however, the substantive issue involved federal judicial
intervention in the state's application of its own criminal laws, there had to be
a convincing showing of direct causation. 136
129. 412 U.S. at 676.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
131. 412 U.S. at 687.
132. But see part III-B infra.
133. 412 U.S. at 676.
134. Id. at 688-89 (footnote omitted).
135. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
136. But see part III-B infra.
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The Court in SCRAP also dealt differently with the degree and singularity
of the injury needed to establish standing to challenge agency action. It was
stated in SCRAP that " '[t]he basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is
that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of
principle .... " 1,37 This contrasts sharply with the statement in an earlier
taxpayer case in which it was held that de minimis injury to a federal tax-
payer is insufficient as a basis for standing.1 38 Again, it seems that the Court
was requiring more injury when there was the possibility of direct confronta-
tion with Congress than when the question was whether or not a regulatory
agency had complied with federal statutes.1 39
Finally, the decision in SCRAP seemingly contravened the Court's position
in Richardson that an injury suffered by the public as a whole is insufficient as
a basis for standing. In SCRAP it was held that "[tlo deny standing to persons
who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion."' 40 In Richardson,
on the other hand, the fact that the grievance was generalized was held to
indicate that the proper forum for redress was the political arena. 14' The
statements are not necessarily inconsistent. A generalized grievance may be
held a sufficient basis for standing to challenge the action of a regulatory
agency since judicial review of agency action is anticipated and usually
authorized by Congress.1 42 Yet, the same grievance might be insufficient to
challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute because such a challenge
necessitates a direct confrontation between the judiciary and the legislature.
E. Summary
As of 1974, the law of standing was far from clear, but there were a
number of recurring themes. The Court had lessened the requirements of
standing to challenge the actions of a federal agency 43 or to seek enforcement
of a federal statute. 144 However, such liberalization did not take place in
challenges to state criminal laws 45 or in federal taxpayers suits.' 4 6 The
decisions from 1970 to 1974 often turned on delicate policy considerations
unique to a particular type of cases. Therefore, any attempt to formulate a
general rule of standing on the basis of these rulings would be counter-
137. 412 U.S. at 689 n.14, quoting Davis, Standing- Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 601, 613 (1968).
138. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923); accord, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
139. But see part IH-B infra.
140. 412 U.S. at 688.
141. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
142. But see part rnII-B infra.
143. See part 11-A supra.
144. See part 11-B supra.
145. See part 11-B supra.
146. See part 11-C supra.
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productive to an understanding of the doctrine, because no single rule would
be responsive to the varying policy considerations which were weighed by the
Court in different decisions. In all the rulings the Court retained the pre-
requisite of injury-in-fact; yet at times even this requirement was held to be
satisfied by a trifle.
147
III. THE MISAPPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES: Warth AND
Evans; Eastern Kentucky
It was against this background that the Supreme Court decided Warth v.
Seldin 148 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 149
and the Second Circuit decided Evans v. Lynn. 150 These decisions reveal the
difficulties that have been caused by the failure of the Court to articulate
clearly the policy considerations underlying the determination of standing in
earlier cases. Moreover, the Second Circuit's decision in Evans, insofar as it
failed to recognize the distinctions between that case and Warth, illustrates
the confusion which has been generated throughout the federal judiciary. In
each decision examined in this section, the plaintiffs were found to be without
standing through the extension of principles not entirely appropriate to the
situation in the case at bar.
A. Warth and Evans
1. The Decisions
In Warth five groups of plaintiffs attempted to challenge the zoning
ordinances of Penfield, New York, a suburb of Rochester. It was alleged that
the zoning ordinances, in purpose and effect, excluded low and moderate
income persons from town by limiting construction of multi-family
dwellings to 0.3% of the land available for residential construction. In
furtherance of this policy, plaintiffs alleged that "Penfield's Town, Zoning,
and Planning Boards had acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner
.... ,,15' to exclude members of racial minorities in violation of the plaintiffs'
first, ninth and fourteenth amendment rights and in violation of sections 1981
to 1983 of Title 42.152
Justice Powell, speaking for a majority of five, held that Penfield's zoning
ordinances could not be challenged by any of the plaintiffs at bar.'
5 3
The first group of plaintiffs, persons of low and moderate income, alleged
that each had a desire to live in Penfield and had made efforts to do so, but
147. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
148. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
149. 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
150. 537 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
151. 422 U.S. at 495.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970).
153. Before dealing with the question of the standing of each of the plaintiffs, the Court
discussed the general nature and purpose of the doctrine. 422 U.S. at 498-502. It also noted that
in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the reviewing and trial courts must accept
all of the material allegations of the complaint as true and draw those inferences which are most
favorable to the complaining party. Id. at 501.
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that they had been unable to find adequate housing there at any price which
they could afford as a result of the town's zoning ordinance.154 The Court
noted that the exclusion alone would be sufficient injury upon which to base
standing. 5 5 Nonetheless, petitioners in Warth did not have standing since
"their inability to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the
area housing market, rather than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts."11 - 6
Relying heavily on Linda R.S.,15 7 Justice Powell noted that the lack of
sufficient causal connection rendered the plaintiff's injury inadequate to meet
article III requirements. The majority found that there was nothing more
than a possibility that any relief afforded by the Court would inure to the
benefit of the plaintiffs, since their ability to live in Penfield would always be
dependent on the acts of third parties, i.e., someone to build and sell housing
at a price plaintiffs could afford. s8
The second group of plaintiffs, taxpayers of the city of Rochester, alleged
economic injury, pleading that Penfield's failure to provide low and moderate
income housing caused Rochester to assume a disproportionate share of this
burden. Consequently, Rochester was forced to allow more tax-abated prop-
erty for low and moderate income housing, resulting in the Rochester tax-
payers' having to shoulder the burden caused by the tax-abated properties.
The Court denied standing to these plaintiffs on two grounds: (1) the line of
causation was so attenuated that the complaint was little more than " 'an
ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,' "1s9 and (2) since there is no
constitutional or statutory right to be free from the adverse effects of a
neighboring community, 160 the petitioners were basing their claims on the
rights of third parties.1 6 1
In dealing with Metro-Act, an organization of taxpayers devoted to racial
problems, Justice Powell noted that insofar as Metro-Act predicated its
standing on its status as a Rochester taxpayer and as a representative of
Rochester taxpayers, a finding of standing was precluded by the Court's prior
holding regarding individual Rochester taxpayers. However, Metro-Act also
alleged that 9% of its members were residents of Penfield and therefore
154. Id. at 502.
155. Id. at 503 n.13.
156. Id. at 506 (footnote omitted).
157. 410 U.S. 614 (1973). See notes 81-86 supra and accompanying text.
158. 422 U.S. at 504-05.
159. Id. at 509, quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). Hence, it would
seem that the report of the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders could also be deemed
a mere "academic exercise in the conceivable" since it found that "(dliscrimination prevents access
to many nonslumn areas, particularly the suburbs, and has a detrimental effect on ghetto housing
itself. By restricting the area open to a growing population, housing discrimination makes it
profitable for landlords to break up ghetto apartments for denser occupancy, hastening housing
deterioration." Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 259 (1968). See
Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 60, at 351.
160. 422 U.S. at 509.
161. Id. As noted above, such a practice is generally forbidden in the federal courts. See note
77 supra and accompanying text-
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claimed standing as a representative of those members who, "as a result of the
persistent pattern of exclusionary zoning practiced by respondents and tile
consequent exclusion of persons of low and moderate income," had been
"deprived of the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated
community. ' 162 Since this was essentially the same claim of injury presented
in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 163 the Court distinguished
that case on the grounds that Trafficante involved an alleged violation of Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968164 while the instant case did not.165 The
Court held that absent the violation of the particular statute involved in
Trafficante there was no judicially cognizable injury. In addition, the alleged
violation of sections 1981 and 1982 was found not to provide a basis for
standing since the plaintiffs did not allege the existence of a contractual or
other relationship protected by those statutes.166 Hence, the claims of the
Penfield residents were also based on the rights of third parties.
Finally, the majority denied the standing of the Rochester Home Builders
Association and the Monroe County Housing Council, both of which claimed
standing as representatives of firms engaged in developing low and moderate
cost housing in the Rochester metropolitan region. Home Builders and
Housing Council sought both damages and prospective relief, alleging that the
zoning ordinances had caused its members injury through lost business and
profits. The Court held that since neither organization alleged an assignment
of damages from their member firms or offered proof as to how much each
firm had lost, neither had standing to seek damages on behalf of its mem-
bers. ' 6
7
The Court also found that neither organization had standing to seek
prospective relief. 168 Since, with one exception, the members of both organi-
zations had no pending plan to build a specific project that could be
completed but for the zoning ordinances, there was no showing "of any injury
. ..of sufficient immediacy and ripeness to warrant judicial intervention."'1 69
As to the one member of Housing Council who had attempted to obtain a
variance to build a specific project, the absence of any indication as to
whether the member was still attempting to pursue the project precluded a
finding that there was still a viable "case or controversy."17 0
162. 422 U.S. at 512.
163. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See text accompanying note 75 supra.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
165. 422 U.S. at 512-13. Although Metro-Act did not allege any violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, the point was argued in an amicus brief filed by the Lawyer's Committee for Civil
Rights under Law. Id. at 513 n.21.
166. Id. at 512-14. The court explicitly rejected standing under § 1983 only for Metro-Act as
representative of Penfield residents, who the court found were merely "harmed indirectly by the
exclusion of others." Id. at 514. Presumably, however, the Court's causation analysis in Warth
precluded a finding of standing under § 1983 for all plaintiffs.
167. Id. at 515-16.
168. Id. at 514-17.
169. Id. at 516.
170. Id. at 517-18. The Supreme Court is currently considering a case in which just such a
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Although Warth involved a direct attack on local zoning ordinances, its
effects were soon felt in a Second Circuit case involving an indirect challenge
to local zoning laws. In Evans v. Lynn,' 7' four plaintiffs residing in low and
moderate income housing sought to enjoin two federal grants to the town of
New Castle, New York. New Castle had applied for and been granted funds
from HUD for the construction of sewer facilities.17 2 New Castle had also
received funds from the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation to develop a local
swamp into a wildlife preserve.' 73 Plaintiffs asserted that the grants were
allocated to " 'a predominantly white' " and " 'well-to-do enclave' located in
northern Westchester County with a minority population of only 1.3 per-
cent."' 174 Plaintiffs claimed "that 90 per cent of New Castle's land is zoned for
single-family, residential development on parcels of more than one acre .... ",7,-
Thus, plaintiffs alleged both that the grants were made in violation of the
viable "case or controversy" appears to exist. In Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975), oral argument heard, Oct. 13, 1976, 45 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Oct.
19, 1976), a nonprofit housing development corporation and a number of individual plaintiffs are
seeking to challenge the refusal of the town to rezone in order to permit the construction of low
and moderate income housing, alleging that the town's refusal is violative of the fourteenth
amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). 373 F. Supp. at 209. The corporate plaintiff in this case had
obtained an option to buy the land in question, had already arranged for the financing of the
proposed project, and, in contesting the zoning ordinance, had fully exhausted available
administrative remedies. 517 F.2d at 410-11. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals
dealt with the question of the plaintiffs' standing, and it appears that the plaintiffs here would
meet the criteria for standing discussed in Warth. 422 U.S. at 517-18. Nevertheless, the Court
could conceivably find that the corporate plaintiffs lack standing because their allegations do not
fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the equal protection clause or the statutes in
issue. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. The court of appeals opinion does not provide
sufficient facts to clarify the standing question as to the individual plaintiffs in Metropolitan
Housing. However, under a Warth analysis, these plaintiffs could be found to lack standing if the
Court determined that they would be unable to afford housing in the project even if it was
constructed. 422 U.S. at 505-06.
171. 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 537 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 537
F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976) (rehearing en banc). The Second Circuit specifically granted rehearing to
reconsider the panel's decision in light of Warth which came down three weeks after the panel's
decision. 537 F.2d at 589.
172. 537 F.2d at 589. These grants were made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3102 (1970), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3102(c) (Supp. IMI, 1973). 537 F.2d at 573 n.3.
173. 517 F.2d at 589. These grants were made pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 4601-8 (1970). 537
F.2d at 573 n.3.
174. Appellant's Brief on Rehearing En Banc at 6, quoting 376 F. Supp at 330. The town's
character and policy of resistance to low and moderate income housing is described in Brown,
Last Holdout Besieged, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1976, § 8 (Real Estate) at 1, col. 1.
175. 537 F.2d at 600 (Oakes, J., dissenting). In addition to its exclusionary zoning policy, the
town had also successfully defeated an attempt by the New York State Urban Development
Corporation to build low cost housing in the town. Id. at n.4. See also Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (zoning prohibition against
"age-oriented" condominium not unconstitutional).
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agencies' duty to affirmatively disburse their funds in a manner consistent
with the federal policy of furthering desegregation, 176 and that the plaintiffs
were persons aggrieved within the meaning of the APA and Title VIII of the
1968 Civil Rights Act.' 7 7 Plaintiffs also asserted that they were injured-in-fact
because the failure of the agencies to administer their funds in accord with the
relevant statute exacerbated segregation within the region. 175
Judge Moore, speaking for the majority, found that plaintiffs did not have
standing under the standards prescribed in Warth. 179 He ruled that plaintiffs'
allegation of injury was abstract and, therefore, constitutionally inadequate as
a basis for standing.18 0 The majority compared the plaintiffs in Evans to the
individual plaintiffs in Warth, denying them standing because, as in Warth,
plaintiff's exclusion was held attributable to economic conditions rather than
the zoning ordinance. 8 1 The court supported its denial of standing by noting
that in Evans the plaintiffs had not alleged that they had sought housing
unsuccessfully in the restricted town as had their counterparts in Warth. 182 In
Judge Moore's words, "[the appellants] claim only that, had the grants not
been approved, the monies could conceivably have gone to some other, as yet
totally imaginary project in the County which might have had the result of
making more housing available to them.'1 8 3 Hence, in Evans the possible
benefits to the plaintiffs of judicial intervention were deemed to be "pure
speculation and conjecture.' 8 4
2. An Analysis
Warth and Evans are troubling decisions because they imposed more rigid
standing requirements than had been foreshadowed by prior rulings; yet
neither opinion fully explains the rationale for the imposition of such severe
standards. The fuzzy reasoning in these cases is especially unfortunate in view
of the policy considerations involved. The plaintiffs in Warth and Evans,
raised allegations of racial discrimination, charges to which the federal courts
have long been particularly receptive.18 5 Moreover, the complaints alleged
176. 537 F.2d at 590. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1, 3608(c), (d)(5) (1970); Shannon v. HUD, 436
F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970) ("Whatever were the most significant features of a workable
program for community improvement in 1949, by 1964 such a program had to be nondiscrimina-
tory in its effects, and by 1968 the Secretary had to affirmatively promote fair housing.")
177. 537 F.2d at 590. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), (d) (1970).
178. Appellant's Brief on Rehearing En Banc at 31-32.
179. The degree to which Judge Moore found Warth controlling is indicated by the fact that
in finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing he quoted rather extensively from Warth. 537 F.2d
at 593-95.
180. Id. at 593.
181. 537 F.2d 593. "[Appellants'] claims of damage flow - if at all - from the Town's
exclusionary practices, not from the specific grant of federal aid. This is an indirect route to the
same charge made more directly in Warth, to wit, an alleged exclusion from housing of their
choice in a more integrated neighborhood." Id. at n.34.
182. See text at notes 155-56 supra.
183. 537 F.2d at 595 (emphasis in original).
184. Id.
185. See note 88 supra.
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discrimination in housing, an area in which federal policy has been clearly
and specifically announced by Congress.18 6 These factors should have
weighed strongly in favor of a finding of standing in both cases.
The basic flaw in Warth is the application of the strict causation require-
ment that the alleged injury flow directly from the challenged action. This
stringent causation standard was imported by the Court from its earlier
decision in Linda R.S., which involved a challenge to the application of a
state penal law. However, the Court specifically stated that its decision in
that case resulted from the "unique context of a challenge to a criminal
statute" 18 7 and "the special status of criminal prosecutions."'188 The extension
of this rationale to the situation in Warth seems unwarranted. The relief
sought in Warth in no way affected a state criminal statute. Hence, the
"unique context" of Linda R.S. was lacking. Furthermore, the allegation of
racial discrimination in housing, in view of the strong stance taken by the
federal legislature and judiciary in this area, arguably should have provided
sufficient reason for the application of more liberal requirements.
Additionally, the mere fact that the relief sought by the individual petition-
ers in Warth was dependent upon the actions of third parties need not have
resulted in a finding that petitioners lacked standing. In both Trafficante and
SCRAP a similar situation existed and in neither case was the plaintiff found
to lack standing. In Justice Brennan's view:
[The plaintiffs could not] be expected, prior to discovery and trial, to know the future
plans of building companies, the precise details of the housing market in Penfield, or
everything which has transpired in 15 years of application of the Penfield zoning
ordinance, including every housing plan suggested and refused. To require them to
allege such facts is to require them to prove their case on paper in order to get into
court at all, reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured in the federal courts.
This Court has not required such unachievable specificity in standing cases in the past
189
The rigid emphasis on causation is made all the more objectionable by the
multiplicity of plaintiffs in Warth. "[O]ne glaring defect of the Court's opinion
is that it views each set of plaintiffs as if it were prosecuting a separate
lawsuit, refusing to recognize that the interests are intertwined, and that the
standing of any one group must take into account its position vis-ih-vis the
others." 190 If the Court felt that the individual plaintiffs were denied access to
Penfield due to the lack of projects that would meet their needs, the fact that
builders were joined as plaintiffs should have been sufficient for a finding of
standing for the individual plaintiffs. Warth was a somewhat unusual case
186. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
187. 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
188. Id. at 619. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct 1917, 1934 n.7
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting).
189. 422 U.S. at 527-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.
411, 421-25 (1969); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), Exclusionary Zoning, supra note
60, at 380-82; Comment, Federal Standing: 1976, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 383, 410-13 (19761, 54
N.C.L. Rev. 449, 458-59 (1976).
190. 422 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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precisely because of the multiplicity of plaintiffs involved. The dissent pointed
out that the majority's opinion, which denied standing to almost every
conceivable type of plaintiff, "can be explained only by an indefensible
hostility to the claim on the merits."' 191
The dismissal of the builders' claims on what were essentially grounds of
ripeness seems equally unjustified. This position virtually requires persons
already directly affected by the zoning law to plan a violation of the ordinance
in order to have standing to challenge it. 192 Such a requirement greatly limits
the number of situations in which minorities who claim de facto exclusion due
to a town's zoning ordinance can establish standing to attack these statutes. It
is also inconsistent with many Supreme Court decisions which held that
plaintiffs had standing to challenge allegedly unconstitutional laws without
showing specific plans to violate them. 193 Finally, by discussing the matter in
terms of standing, rather than ripeness, 94 the Court needlessly obfuscated the
meaning of standing, implying that the concept embodies at least ripeness,
and possibly all the other avoidance techniques developed under article 111. 195
Another deficiency of Warth is its apparent revival of the legal interest test.
Distinguishing Trafficante on the grounds that the instant case did not involve
any alleged violation of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the Court ignored the
finding in Trafficante that the exclusion of racial minorities is injury-in-fact
both to those excluded and those living in the area in which the minorities are
denied housing opportunities. 196 Instead, the Court found that the Rochester
taxpayers in Warth lacked standing because they could not "assert any
personal right under the Constitution or any statute to be free of action by
a neighboring municipality that may have some incidental adverse effect on
Rochester."' 197 It would seem, however, that the existence of this right was
the very thing sought to be adjudicated in Warth. Five years earlier, in Data
Processing, the Court had rejected such a legal interest test to determine
standing because it involved a premature examination of the merits of the
case. 198 It is difficult to understand why a test which goes to the merits of a
challenge to an administrative agency action does not also go to the merits of
a challenge to a local zoning ordinance. Yet the Court relied on this discred-
ited formula despite the long established policy of maintaining accessibility to
a federal judicial forum for charges of racial discrimination.' 99
191. Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, § 22.02-4 (1976).
193. Id. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485 (1952); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). Contra, Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
194. 422 U.S. at 516-17.
195. See Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 60, at 378-80. See notes 38-43 supra and accom-
panying text.
196. 409 U.S. at 209-10; Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 60, at 370-73.
197. 422 U.S. at 509.
198. See note 63 supra and accompanying text,
199. See note 88 supra.
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The reasoning in Evans200 is plagued by even greater inconsistencies than
that in Warth. Despite the logical weaknesses discussed above, the result in
Warth is perhaps understandable because a Supreme Court ruling on the
merits in Warth would have resulted either in direct interference by the
federal judiciary with the formulation of local zoning laws, or in a holding
that to some degree might seem to sanction the enactment of zoning ordi-
nances which result in de facto segregation. The former course would involve
direct federal intrusion into an area long recognized to be the appropriate
province of state and local governments.2 01 The latter would result in a
holding which might well be construed as a retreat from the traditional
federal policy of encouraging racial integration.20 2 The Second Circuit in
Evans, however, was not confronted with this dilemma, since a finding of
standing in Evans would not necessarily have resulted in the adoption of
either of these disagreeable alternatives. The essential difference between
Warth and Evans was that the latter involved a challenge to the practices of
an administrative agency. Therefore, the relief sought would in no way
directly affect the validity of New Castle's zoning ordinances. Thus, the case
did not have the same potential as Warth for head-on confrontation with state
and local governments. As Judge Oakes, in his dissent on rehearing, pointed
out:
[I]t must be remembered that the controversy sought to be determined is not, as in
Warth v. Seldin . . .whether a town in which the plaintiffs are not resident[s] may
200. The original decision of the Second Circuit in Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.
1975), in which it was found that the plaintiffs did have standing has so far met with mixed
reactions. Compare 50 St. John's L. Rev. 303, 315 (1976) t"By assuming whatever increased
burden results from the Evans decision, courts can provide an additional but much needed forum
for promoting the policy of the Civil Rights Acts.") and 53 J. Urban L. 3S5, 363 (1975) (-The
Evans court properly took a position contrary to the one dictated by blind obedience to the Warth
result.") with Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 60, at 394-95 "[Tihe Evans plaintiffs' alleged
injury - the perpetuation of their living conditions as a result of the challenged funding - is
analogous to the injury alleged by the low-income, minority non-residents of Penfield in Warth:
the perpetuation of their living conditions as a result of Penfield's exclusionary zoning practices."
This was an injury the Supreme Court rejected in Warth.).
In the last cited article, the authors compare the 1975 Evans decision to the one in City of
Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), a case which closely paralleled the factual
situation in Evans. The authors note that City of Hartford involved statutes other than those
involved in Evans which provide for the reallocation of disapproved funds with first priority
given to other areas within the same state. Exclusionary Zoning. supra note 60, at 399-400 See
42 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. V, 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 570.409(fgl((i) (1975). The authors conclude,
therefore, that City of Hartford is correctly decided in that there was a much higher probability
that the plaintiffs would benefit from the relief sought. Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 60. at
402. However, due to the fact that the court in City of Hartford regarded the 1975 Evans decision
as dispositive of the standing issue, the future of City of Hartford is questionable-
201. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally Note,
Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent Federal and State Court Approaches, 4
Fordham Urban L.J. 147 (1975).
202. See note 88 supra.
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exclude persons of low and moderate income by its zoning laws. Rather .. . the
question brought in this case is whether federal agencies administering grants-in-aid
may approve grants to "activities" . . . whose practices ... have the purpose and
effect of subjecting blacks and other racial minorities to discrimination by excluding
them from residence within the Town's borders .... 203
In view of this difference, it would seem that the majority's wooden 20 4
application of Warth was inappropriate. Although both cases involved chal-
lenges to zoning, the indirect nature of the challenge in Evans and the fact
that jurisdiction in that case was predicated on the APA, should have served
to distinguish Warth. The Supreme Court held in SCRAP that where federal
agency action is challenged under the APA, an "identifiable trifle" is sufficient
for standing. 205 When, as in Evans, a complaint is brought under the APA
alleging racial discrimination, the standing requirement should be as minimal
as possible within the confines of article III.
Therefore, a more suitable standard for assessing the plaintiff's standing in
Evans is that employed by the Supreme Court in SCRAP. Both SCRAP and
Evans were challenges to agency action in which standing was predicated on
the APA. Moreover, both cases involved statutes20 6 which clearly announced
federal policy concerning the subject matter of the litigation. Yet the majority
in Evans applied the strict Warth causation requirements (i.e., "but for"
causation apparent on the face of the complaint) and found that, as in Warth,
the benefit of the relief sought would be dependent on the acts of third parties
(i.e., the diversion of the funds from New Castle to build an "as yet totally
imaginary project in the County which might have had the result of making
more housing available to [the plaintiffs]").2 0 7 In SCRAP too, plaintiff's relief
was contingent upon the acts of third parties, but the Court did not therefore
find itself compelled to deny the plaintiffs' standing. To the contrary, in
SCRAP the Court left the proof of the allegation of causation to the trial on
the merits.
Under the criteria applied in SCRAP, the proper inquiry in Evans would
have been whether the plaintiffs' allegation of causation and injury consti-
tuted anything more than "an ingenious academic exercise in the conceiv-
able. '20 8 Indeed, the allegations in Evans are far more convincing than those
which the Supreme Court approved in SCRAP, since the perpetuation of
segregated housing conditions has been recognized as injury-in-fact. 20 9 Under
203. 537 F.2d at 602-03.
204. See note 179 supra.
205. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
206. SCRAP involved the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et
seq. (1970). Evans involved Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
(1970).
207. 537 F.2d at 595.
208. 412 U.S. at 688.
209. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1970); Jones v. Tully, 378 F. Supp.
286, 287 & n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Meade, 510 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1185 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973).
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the SCRAP criteria, the Evans plaintiffs also alleged sufficient causal connec-
tion to withstand a motion to dismiss, since the sewer project to be funded by
HUD would only have the capacity to handle the area's needs if the town's
exclusionary zoning ordinance was retained.2 10 Finally, under this view, the
benefit of the relief sought would not be dependent upon the acts of third
parties, since the direct remedial effect would be to eliminate conditions
which perpetuate segregation within the region. 21'
Thus, it would seem that the Second Circuit in Evans failed to perceive the
distinctions between that case and Warth, and as a result held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing through the application of inappropriate criteria. By
imposing a statutory duty on HUD to disburse its funds in a manner
consistent with the federal policy of desegregation, Congress has seen fit to
use a "carrot and stick"2 12 approach. Under this method, Congress attacks
segregation by requiring potential receipients of federal grants to comply with
certain conditions in order to receive the funds. The failure of the courts, in
cases like Evans, to reach the merits through the imposition of overly rigid
standing requirements can effectively frustrate that approach by not provid-
ing a forum in which to determine whether the requisite conditions have been
satisfied.
B. Eastern Kentucky
The most perplexing of recent standing decisions is the Supreme Court's
ruling in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization. 213 In that
case, several indigents and organizations composed of indigents brought suit
against the Secretary of the Treasury. Plaintiffs sought to challenge a Revenue
Ruling2 14 of the IRS which extended certain tax benefits to hospitals which
provide free emergency treatment only to indigent patients.' s The complaint
alleged that this ruling was violative of the statute21 6 which set the guidelines
for determining the qualifications of charitable corporations, and that the
ruling had been promulgated in violation of congressionally imposed 2 '7 pro-
cedures. 2 18 Plaintiffs predicated their standing on the judicial review provi-
sion of the APA.2 1 9 They alleged " 'injury in their opportunity and ability to
210. 537 F.2d at 605, relying on the Affidavit of Paul Davidoff, Director of Suburban Action
Institute. That sewer systems have an effect on a town's development pattern is also supported by
the fact that New Castle's own master plan prohibited the consideration of sanitary sewers as a
basis for rezoning. Id. at 600 n.4.
211. 537 F.2d at 605 n.15 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
212. See generally R. Babcock & F. Bosselman, Exclusionary Zoning, Land Use Regulation
and Housing in the 1970s 144 (1973); Fisher, The Carrot and the Stick: Conditions for Federal
Assistance, 6 Harv. J. Legis. 401 (1969).
213. 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
214. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 Cure. Bull. 117.
215. 96 S. Ct. at 1919-20.
216. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501(c)(3).
217. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
218. 96 S. Ct. at 1922.
219. Id. at 1924.
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receive hospital services in nonprofit hospitals which receive ... benefits...
as "charitable" organizations' under the Code. ' 220 Plaintiffs further asserted
that they had been denied free non-emergency services at hospitals which
received tax benefits from the challenged ruling.
22 1
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, found that neither the
individuals nor the organizations had standing to challenge the ruling. 222 Since
the organizations had not alleged any injury to themselves, their standing was
held to be dependent upon that of their members. 223 The individual members
were found to lack standing because the causal link between the ruling in
question and the plaintiffs' alleged injury was found to be "speculative." 224
The Court accepted as true the allegation that the ruling encouraged
hospitals to provide fewer medical services to indigents. 225 However, it
reasoned that the encouragement of the denial of services was not a sufficient
allegation to establish that the actual denials of services suffered by the
plaintiffs were caused by the challenged ruling rather than by "decisions made
by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications. '226 Thus, the majority
held that the injury alleged was not "fairly . . . trace[able] ' ' 227 to the
challenged action. The Court further noted that plaintiffs did not allege that
the hospitals which had denied them services were dependent upon the
benefits received under the ruling in question. 228 Therefore, the majority
found that plaintiffs' allegations failed to indicate that the exercise of the
Court's remedial power would benefit them.2 29 The Court suggested that "it is
just as plausible that the hospitals to which [plaintiffs] appl[ied] for service
would elect to forego favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined
financial drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated services." 230
Finally, the Court stated that plaintiffs' receipt of free, non-emergency
services was ultimately dependent upon the actions of hospitals - parties not
before the Court.2 31 The majority, therefore, found that the attenuated
relationship between the action challenged and the injury alleged was identi-
cal to that in Linda R.S. and Warth. 232 Thus, these decisions were held to
control the outcome of the case at bar. 233
Although, as noted above, 234 the result in Warth was perhaps justifiable on
220. Id. at 1922.
221. Id. at 1925.
222. Id. at 1920.
223. Id. at 1925.
224. Id. at 1926-27.
225. Id. at 1926 n.23.
226. Id. at 1926.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1927.
233. Id.
234. See text accompanying note 201 supra.
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the ground that it prevented federal judicial interference with what were
essentially local matters, the decision in Eastern Kentucky seems inconsistent
with appropriate Supreme Court precedent and unwarranted by relevant
policy considerations. Since the case was brought under the APA, the
majority's reliance on Linda R.S. and Warth was improper. As Justice
Brennan, dissenting, stated:
[a]ny prudential, nonconstitutional considerations that underlay the Court's disposition
of the injury in fact standing requirement in cases such as Linda R. S. ... and Warth
. .. are simply inapposite when review is sought under a congressionally enacted
statute conferring standing and providing for judicial review. - ' -
In both those cases, the Court's reluctance to reach the merits was under-
standable because the substantive issues touched upon matters long entrusted
to state and local governments. However, in Eastern Kentucky, as in Evans,
plaintiffs sought to challenge the presumptively reviewable23 6 action of an
administrative agency "to ensure that the attainment of congressionally man-
dated goals [was] not frustrated by illegal action .... ,,.a Thus, the
application of the causation requirements of Linda R.S. and t'a rth to a
challenge brought under the APA is, to say the least, disconcerting. "-38
As the dissent indicated, the appropriate precedent in Eastern Kentucky
would have been SCRAP and other cases brought under under the APA, in
which the plaintiffs' standing was not vitiated because the ultimate benefit of
the relief sought was dependent upon the actions of third parties or because
the line of causation was attenuated..2 39 Although the majority did mention
SCRAP, their treatment of the case was relegated to a rather cryptic footnote
reference. 240 Under the view of the majority, the plaintiffs in SCRAP alleged
an injury "flowing" 241 from the challenged action while the plaintiffs in the
instant case failed "to allege an injury that fairly can be traced to [the]
challenged action. '242 The Court appears to have relied upon a distinction
without a difference since it failed to clarify the vague terms "flowing" and
"fairly traceable." Moreover, contrary to the majority's analysis, a comparison
of the facts in SCRAP and Eastern Kentucky reveals a far more plausible
causal connection in the latter case. 243 Thus, the Court merely concluded that
SCRAP was distinguishable without supporting that conclusion by analysis or
explanation. 244
A second problem with Eastern Kentucky is that it apparently goes beyond
Warth by demanding that plaintiffs draw their complaint with even greater
235. 96 S. Ct. at 1934 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissentingi
236. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
237. 96 S. Ct. at 1937 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
238. Id. at 1934 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
239. Id. at 1934-35 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
240. Id. at 1927 n.25.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1935 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
244. Id. at 1936 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
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specificity than was required in that case. The majority in Eastern Kentucky
accepted as true the allegation that the ruling in question "encouraged" the
denial of services; yet it further required that the plaintiffs allege facts to
indicate that the hospitals in question were dependent upon the tax benefits
received under the challenged ruling. 245 The majority appears to be demand-
ing not only that the challenged action be a cause of the plaintiffs' injury, but
that it be the cause. Such a requirement is not only offensive to the modern
concept of notice pleading 246 but sets a standard which, if strictly imposed,
would be virtually impossible to meet. Logically, it would seem to prevent the
challenging of any action which is the result of concurrent causes unless the
challenge is brought against the actors responsible for each concurrent
cause. 
2 4 7
A third difficulty with the majority opinion in Eastern Kentucky is the
failure of the Court once again to distinguish between artcle III requirements
and discretionary limitations on standing. In Warth, the Court found that the
individual plaintiffs lacked standing for an essentially prudential reason: they
were trying to assert the rights of third parties. 248 Therefore, the holding in
Warth would not prevent the Court from later reversing itself should it find
that other factors outweighed these prudential considerations in a subsequent
case. In Eastern Kentucky, on the other hand, the decision was placed
squarely on constitutional grounds. 249 Thus the ruling precludes later modifi-
cation of the result either by Congress 250 or the Court. Such a holding could
act as a considerable impediment to the effectuation of congressional policies.
Under the approach of the majority:
[Any time Congress chooses to legislate in favor of certain interests by setting up a
scheme of incentives for third parties, judicial review of administrative action that
245. Id. at 1932 & n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
246. Id. at 1932 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting). See Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
247. The problem discussed in the text finds analogy in tort law dealing with concurrent
causes where any one cause alone would be sufficient to produce the plaintiff's injury. Rather
than requiring that defendant's acts be the sole cause of plaintiff's injury, the requirement is that
"[ilf the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows
that he will not be absolved from liability merely because other causes have contributed to the
result, since such causes, innumberable, are always present." W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41 at
240 (4th ed. 1971); accord, Gantt v. Sissell, 222 Ark. 902, 263 S.W.2d 916 (1954); Barringer v.
Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960); Henthorne v. Hopwood, 218 Ore. 336, 345 1P.2d
249 (1959).
In Eastern Kentucky, whether the challenged ruling alone would have produced the plaintiffs'
injury or whether it was a "substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injury" may have been
difficult to prove. However, this factor made it all the more improper that the issue was
considered as part of the "threshold" question of standing and, thus, considered before the trial on
the merits.
248. See text accompanying notes 158, 161 supra.
249. 96 S. Ct. at 1928.
250. Id. at 1936-37 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
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allegedly frustrates the congressionally intended objective will be denied, because any
complainant will be required to make an almost impossible showing.2'
The holding in Eastern Kentucky also calls into question the continued
vitality of SCRAP. As was indicated above,25 2 the allegation of causal
connection was more plausible in Eastern Kentucky than that in SCRAP; yet
the Court was willing to follow the more attenuated causal chain in the latter
case, but would not follow that alleged in the former. Had the plaintiffs in
Eastern Kentucky been found to lack standing for prudential reasons, the
result would at least have been conceptually consistent with SCRAP. How-
ever, to place the result on constitutional grounds as the Court did, could
logically suggest that the allegations in SCRAP were also constitutionally
insufficient. Nevertheless, the Court did not expressly question SCRAP but
rather simply "distinguished" it.2s 3 In any event, after the decision in Eastern
Kentucky, plaintiffs raising issues under the APA will be confronted with two
inconsistent guidelines to the constitutional minimum for standing: the
"trifle" 254 found sufficient in SCRAP, and the "fairly traceable'2 ss require-
ments of Eastern Kentucky. As Justice Brennan pointed out:
The Court's treatment of injury in fact without any "particularization" in light of
either the policies properly implicated or our relevant precedents threatens that
[standing] shall "become a catchall for an unarticulated discretion on the part of this
Court" to insist that the federal courts "decline to adjudicate" claims that it prefers
they not hear. 25 6
Finally, the majority's use of standing to decline to reach the merits in
Eastern Kentucky is most disturbing. Even if it is assumed that the IRS is an
agency which warrants special deference from the judiciary due to its crucial
role in the collection of the public fisc, the majority's reliance on standing to
guarantee this deference was unnecessary. In Eastern Kentucky the defendant
challenged both the jurisdiction and the propriety of judicial intervention in a
number of ways: 25 7 non-justiciability of the subject matter, prohibition of
plaintiffs' suit under the Anti-Injunction Act, 2- 8 the statutory prohibition
against declaratory judgments with respect to federal taxes,2 - 9 and sovereign
immunity. Moreover, defendant's argument before the Supreme Court was
essentially couched in terms of ripeness.2 60 In the view of two members of the
Court, the case should have been decided on this ground. 26 1 Faced with this
251. Id. at 1937 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
252. See text accompanying note 243 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 240-44 supra.
254. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
255. 96 S. Ct. at 1926.
256. Id. at 1937-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting), quoting Poe v_
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
257. 96 S. Ct. at 1922.
258. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421(a).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
260. 96 S. Ct. at 1930 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissentingi.
261. Id. at 1928-30 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
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multiplicity of avoidance techniques, the majority's use of standing is espe-
cially unfortunate. There was no need to resort to a doctrine of such broad
application in a manner which totally failed to recognize those policy consid-
erations which should have distinguished the instant case from the precedents
relied upon by the majority. 262 Furthermore, the Court's placing the case on
constitutional rather than statutory grounds seems inconsistent with its estab-
lished policy of avoiding constitutional adjudications whenever possible. 263
In sum, the Court's standing decision in Eastern Kentucky was unneces-
sary, logically confused, and inconsistent with relevant Supreme Court prece-
dent.
IV. CONCLUSION
An attempt to formulate a generalized statement of the test for standing in
federal courts would indeed be "largely worthless," 264 primarily because no
such single standard exists. The Court has applied several inconsistent tests to
a number of different situations. Nevertheless, these cases can, for the most
part, be understood if it is recognized that the primary goal of the Court in
this area has not been to achieve a consistent definition of standing but to
maintain a consistent policy regarding the role of the judiciary within the
federal system.
Standing is a powerful vehicle through which federal courts can exercise
their discretion. However, the propriety of using this particular technique in
some instances is questionable. The federal taxpayer suits serve as a good
example of this problem. Throughout the opinions in Richardson and
Schlesinger, the Court made clear its desire to limit the role of the judiciary
within a representative form of government. In view of this concern, perhaps
an innovative re-evaluation of the political question doctrine might have been
more appropriate than the application of a concept which ostensibly focuses
on the plaintiff's "personal stake" in having the case decided.
Secondly, the use of standing to implement policy is often troubling
because, when articulating the decision only on terms of standing, a court
does not have the opportunity to explain fully the policy considerations which
are so often determinative in a particular case. Dealing with the problem in a
manner that would facilitate such a discussion would certainly be more
intellectually honest than relying on a doctrine which, in theory, is not
relevant to the substantive issues at bar. The present approach of the Court
can only further complicate the law of standing. In fact, recent cases have
already resulted in inconsistent applications of judicial policies and frustration
of those promulgated by Congress. The Court's decision in Eastern Kentucky
is the most flagrant example of this problem, since in that case neither logic
nor policy justified the use of the standing doctrine or the manner in which it
was applied. The Trafficante and Evans cases further illustrate this point. In
the former the Court was quite liberal in finding standing, a result which is
262. See text accompanying note 235 supra.
263. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
264. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
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explicable in terms of the underlying issue and the clear delineation by
Congress of the federal policy in this area. However, due to the Court's failure
to discuss the impact of this consideration on the decision in Trafficante, the
Second Circuit in Evans did not apply the same liberal requirements, and,
consequently, obstructed federal policy. As Judge Gurfein noted in his dissent-
ing opinion in Evans:
[A] narrow holding on standing can be the equivalent of a substantive repeal of the
legislation. The issue is really not whether the courts should abstain by denying
standing, but whether by rejecting standing the courts are impeding national policy as
expressed in the legislative will.2 65
In contrast, the opinion in Warth clearly differentiated between the article
III requirements of standing and the prudential aspects of the doctrine. The
Court in Warth pointed out that the general prohibitions against predicating
one's standing upon the rights of third parties or upon generalized grievances
are discretionary limitations imposed by the Court rather than constitutional
requirements of article 11.266 Such an approach is clearly to be preferred over
that in Eastern Kentucky, where the majority ignored the fact that the
doctrine of standing encompasses both a constitutional and a discretionary
dimension. The reasoning in Warth distinguishes those situations in which a
federal court cannot rule from those in which it chooses not to rule. Thus, it
preserves the option of a federal court to entertain a similar case when
countervailing factors outweigh the prudential concerns which make the court
reluctant to decide the case currently before it. On the other hand, the
analysis in Eastern Kentucky further obscures the meaning of standing due to
the Court's failure to acknowledge the dual nature of the doctrine. Conse-
quently, that approach only hinders recognition of those relevant policy
considerations which underlie the Court's prior decisions on standing and
which ultimately justify the use of the doctrine.
In the future, therefore, the Court should clearly distinguish article LII
requirements from prudential limitations on standing. The separation of
prudential from constitutional concerns would result in better reasoned, more
informative opinions since the policy issues involved in a particular case
would be fully and openly examined. Such a practice could also provide the
Court with an opportunity to clarify the presently confused state of the
doctrine regarding the relationship between causation and standing. The
difficulties in this area are exemplified by Linda R.S., Warth and Eastern
Kentucky. Each of these cases applied more stringent causation requirements
than those in Trafficante and SCRAP, yet no explanation was given as to why
these different standards were used. Certainly, it is necessary to distinguish
allegations of causation which are clearly frivolous from those which are at
least arguable. However, the use of standing to make this distinction has not
yet produced any meaningful guidelines on this issue. Finally, it should be
noted that the Court's open acknowledgment that it is choosing not to rule in
265. 537 F.2d at 612 (Gurfein, J., dissenting).
266. 422 U.S. at 499.
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a particular case would breach no constitutional provision since it seems clear
under the abstention doctrine that a federal court may, in some instances,
2 67
decline to decide a case over which it does have jurisdiction.
A properly passive judiciary is not undesirable. To the contrary in Justice
Powell's view, it is the general reticence of federal courts "that has maintained
public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence
of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic
principles upon which our Federal Government'in the final analysis rests. '268
In addition to maintaining respect for the courts, judicial reticence should also
have the effect of limiting a court's workload and enabling it to deal more
effectively with the cases before it. However, it is necessary to distinguish
between responsible judicial reserve and judicial "abdication. '269 The distinc-
tion between the two is subtle and may well be one of degree rather than
kind. Nevertheless, the distinction must be made if the judiciary is to perform
its proper role within the federal system. The doctrine of standing, in its
present form, does little to assist the judiciary in making this crucial distinc-
tion; indeed, it has only served to make the task more burdensome.
Henry Pitman
267. When the Court does invoke the abstention doctrine, it technically retains jurisdiction
pending a determination by a state court of the relevant state law. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 244 n.4 (1967); Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485, 487 (1956); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). However, under Professor Wright's analysis, there are four distinct
abstention doctrines, one of which is a doctrine of dismissal which allows "a federal court [to]
refrain from exercising its jurisidction in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration
by a state of its own affairs." C. Wright, Federal Courts § 52 at 199 (1970).
268. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
269. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
